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Playing with pattern. Aesthetic communication 
as distributed cognition 
José Ignacio Contreras
Abstract. This article’s main thesis is that aesthetic communication has evolved from 
animal social play to forms of extraordinary complexity such as traditional arts, help-
ing to preserve and transfer survival oriented information in a preverbal, or embod-
ied form. Following this line of argument, aesthetic communication provides the basis 
for an adaptive modeling of reality wherein the agents engaged simulate potential 
exchanges and outcomes with factual or fictive entities, further enhancing – by proxy 
– their ability to predict and adapt to natural and intentional contingencies. By means 
of aesthetic communication human cognition has become distributed, i.e. off-loaded 
in the practices, customs and emotional templates readily available in culture. In this 
light, the decline of traditional societies and the isolation of art practices that results 
from it, are to be considered subjects of scientific concern in addressing the societal 
and ecological crisis we confront today.
Keywords. Evolutionary aesthetics, animal play, cybernetics, cultural evolution, epis-
temology.
The ultimate paradox may be that
play can only be understood through itself. 
Burghardt (2005): 405
One of the first things that strike us about art is its costliness. 
Whether we stand in front of Lascaux; Hagia Sophia; the sand man-
dalas of Tibetan monks, a Bach chorale, or the elaborate body paint-
ings for the initiation passage of the Selk’nam people, we respond 
to this elaborateness with a sense of wonder. Where does the mag-
nificence of it all come from? What is the payoff of such sophis-
ticated patterns of behavior? As George Bataille (1949) once said, 
«art is an occasion of destruction of wealth»1. Art is time consum-
1 Bataille was probably developing an idea advanced by Marcel Mauss (1925) 
in his essay The gift, that examines the practice of potlatch by indigenous 
tribes of northwest America. The potlatch consists in a gift-giving feast in 
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ing, effort taking, and seemingly doesn’t produce 
any consumable goods. In evolutionary ortho-
doxy there’s an implicit law of economics at work. 
Behavior that’s replicated over the eons must of 
necessity increase the survival fitness either of 
the individual, the group, or the species. Thus, 
any question regarding the origins of art, seems 
impossible without considering a proper evolu-
tionary perspective, one that embraces the phylog-
eny of human behavior and offers a comprehensive 
account of how the arts may or may not contrib-
ute to the overall survival fitness of our species. 
An anthropological perspective is also a neces-
sary complement for this kind of research. Art is 
a cultural phenomenon, and although it would be 
easier to talk about art in general and move for-
ward within the safe premises of western art and 
theory, from a biological standpoint this narrow-
ness is inadvisable, to say the least. Regardless of 
what we consider high or low art expressions, if we 
are to propose a working hypothesis on the origins 
and adaptive value of art, it needs to be falsifiable 
within the vast spectrum of cultures and peoples 
that have been reported by field researchers all 
over the world. It would also be sensible to listen 
to what artists, poets, philosophers, and aesthetes 
have to say about the matter. Although the intro-
spective method has been systematically discred-
ited by contemporary academia, people who have 
devoted their entire life to the practice and theory 
of art have developed a sophisticated vocabulary, 
along with subtle emotional responses to the phe-
nomenon under scrutiny. To deliberately neglect 
this evidence is to suppress any chance of dialogue 
between the natural sciences and humanities, thus 
severing our hypothesis from general validity. 
The passage between these divergent disciplines is 
harsh, but it’s a passage one needs to traverse back 
and forth, in order to wind up with a sufficiently 
robust theory. In the next pages we are about to 
present an overview of findings in various fields of 
which a chieftain challenges or responds to another chief-
tain either by giving away or destroying his wealth. The 
greater the wealth destroyed in the feast, the higher the 
status attained by the chieftain.
study, such as animal behavior, cybernetics, cogni-
tive science, ecology and evolutionary aesthetics. 
Considered as a whole, this article offers an evo-
lutionary account on of the origins and adaptive 
value of art. 
COSTLINESS OF ART AND PLAY
As we have already mentioned, one conspicu-
ous feature of art’s manifold expressions is its cost-
liness. Not only from a pedestrian approach to 
the arts does this costliness perplex us, but also 
from an evolutionary frame of inquiry, where the 
biological costs of artistic behavior might seem 
unjustified in the absence of any solid benefits. 
Bearing this in mind, one should ask if we happen 
to know about any other behavior in the animal 
kingdom whose costs apparently exceed its ben-
efits, which is time consuming and has patterned 
and recognizable features that distinguish it from 
the repertoire of the species’ typical behavior. Cer-
tainly, our best candidate would be animal play2. 
Burghardt (2005) defines five ethological criteria 
for the recognition of animal play. For the sake of 
convenience, we present them at length to be con-
sulted further in the development of this article. 
1. Limited immediate function: behavior is direct-
ed toward stimuli that do not contribute to cur-
rent survival. 2. Endogenous component: behavior 
2 We will refer to non-human animal behavior or non-
human animal play behavior throughout the paper boldly 
as animal behavior and animal play. There are at least two 
good reasons for abridging this convention. The first is, 
there’s no longer controversy in referring to the human 
species as part of the animal kingdom, so when speak-
ing of animal behavior or animal play behavior as dis-
tinct phenomena from human behavior or human play, it 
should be stressed that we are acknowledging common-
alities as well as differences with the human species-spe-
cific repertoire. The second reason is formal. As the paper 
provides a brief historical account on the subject of ani-
mal play, most of the quotations are foreign to the sub-
tleties of contemporary conventions. If adhering to the 
non-human animal convention could probably lead some 
readers to confusion, we rather risk a little anachronism 
for the sake of transparency.
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is spontaneous, voluntary, intentional, pleasurable 
(and) rewarding. 3. Structural or temporal differ-
ence: behavior involves patterns with modified form, 
sequencing, or targeting. 4. Repeated performance: 
behavior is performed repeatedly in a similar, but not 
rigidly stereotyped form, during at least a portion of 
the animal’s ontogeny. 5. Relaxed field: behavior takes 
place when the animal is adequately fed, healthy, and 
free from stress. (Burghardt [2005]: 71-77)
Burghardt’s work is a splendid synthesis of 
almost a century of research dedicated to the sub-
ject of animal play, but what’s particularly interest-
ing for our study is that it provides a comprehen-
sive approach to behavior allowing for a seamless 
transition from animal to human play. Taking a 
glance at the costliest and most patterned exem-
plars of each tradition and testing them against 
Burghardt’s five criteria, the omnipresence of play 
in human culture would be hard to contend with. 
The analogy between play and the costly prod-
ucts of culture such as religion and the arts is not 
a recent one. It was Huizinga (1938) in his semi-
nal book, Homo Ludens who first undertook an 
attempt to interpret the vast field of human cul-
ture in the light of play. «According to Huizinga, 
play is the ultimate source of virtually all cultural 
systems: myth and ritual, law, poetry, wisdom, 
and science» (Bellah [2011]: 76). If that weren’t 
enough, he even speculated that play had some-
thing crucial to do with the emergence of mind, 
and in this respect he was at least two decades 
ahead of the incipient study of cybernetics.
But in acknowledging play you acknowledge mind, for 
whatever else play is, it is not matter. Even in the ani-
mal world it bursts the bounds of the physically exist-
ent. From the point of view of a world wholly deter-
mined by the operation of blind forces, play would 
be altogether superfluous. Play only becomes possi-
ble, thinkable and understandable when an influx of 
mind breaks down the absolute determinism of the 
cosmos. (Huizinga, [1938]: 3)
Huizinga’s argument is deeply indebted to the 
Letters on the aesthetic education of man, a pio-
neer work by the German poet Friedrich Schiller 
(1795). «(Man) is only completely a man when he 
plays» says Schiller. For modern thinkers such as 
Schiller, Baumgartner, or Kant himself, who were 
highly concerned with ideas regarding human 
moral dignity and ultimate purpose, aesthetic phe-
nomena were paramount instances of freedom as 
opposed to natural determinism. Taking pleasure 
in the arts, whether musical, representational or 
visual; devoting one’s time and genius to the play 
of pure reason or the quest for a transcendent 
truth; all of them require a uniquely human disin-
terestedness. This predilection of modern thinkers 
with the costly products of human culture as hav-
ing something to do with moral dignity is remi-
niscent of the classical notion of arête (ἀρετή), an 
attribute of the Greek aristocracy that consisted 
in showing one’s excellence in various disciplines, 
particularly those that conspicuously produced no 
goods and were solely aimed at the refinement of 
body and spirit (Jaeger, [1947]: 421). Evidently, the 
Letters draw a lot from this source, and the text as 
a whole could be read as a sort of renewed paid-
eia (παιδεία), but Schiller does not stop here, and 
goes on to propose a play instinct that he discov-
ers in the whole of nature.
It is true that Nature has given even to creatures 
without reason more than the bare necessities of exist-
ence, and shed a glimmer of freedom even into the 
darkness of animal life. With what enjoyment of life 
do insects swarm in the sunbeam; and it is certainly 
not the cry of desire that we hear in the melodious 
warbling of the songbird. (…) An animal may be said 
to be at work, when the stimulus to activity is some 
lack; it may be said to be at play, when the stimulus 
is sheer plenitude of vitality, when superabundance of 
life is its own incentive to action. (Schiller [1795]:207)
Before we drift away to humanities for good, it 
would be advisable to draw from here a connec-
tion with the natural sciences. In fact, Schiller’s 
ideas, though seldom credited, were very influen-
tial in the beginnings of play theory. It was Her-
bert Spencer (1855) who first observed from a 
naturalist point of view that «once an animal no 
longer had to expend all its energy on survival, 
the surplus could be released in play» and else-
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where he likens play with aesthetic activities by 
affirming that they «neither subserve, in any direct 
way, the processes conducive to life» (Spencer 
[1855]: 627). So we find Spencer suspect not only 
of forgetting the source of his valuable insights, 
but contrary to evolutionary orthodoxy, advo-
cating a somewhat paradoxical definition of ani-
mal play, in which he denies play – and aesthetic 
activities – any survival benefit, leaving the cost-
liness of the behavior unexplained. The so called 
Surplus Energy Theory, ignited a long lasting 
debate around whether or not play serves a bio-
logical function either immediate or delayed that 
would account for its costliness (Groos [1898]; 
Power [2000]), what conditions had to be met 
before engaging in playful behavior (Craig [1918]; 
Bally [1945]; Burghardt [2005]), or why it is self-
reinforcing – i.e. pleasurable – for participants and 
onlookers. Truth be told, we haven’t yet arrived 
at a conclusive explanation for any of these prob-
lems, but as we carefully gather observations and 
draw valuable insights from models that have 
proven predictive across taxa, the analogy between 
animal and human play becomes an ever more 
compelling one and so do our chances for present-
ing a plausible account of the origins and adaptive 
value of art as a human form of play.
So far we have pinpointed strong analogies 
between the costliness and elaborateness of both 
play and the arts. Could we stress the analogy even 
further? Burghardt’s (2005) Surplus Resource The-
ory (SRT) provides a useful and integrative model 
to understand which factors underlie the emer-
gence of play. Variables in the animal’s Ontogeny; 
Energetics; Psychology/Sociality and Ecology are 
all to be considered as having a strong influence 
in the playfulness of the species under study. What 
should be noted for our current survey is that the 
ubiquity of play in human culture could hardly be 
explained as a mere by-product of evolution. Since 
the beginnings of archaic societies, art, ritual, and 
costly elaborateness have played a role in modeling 
our now highly domesticated environment, operat-
ing a positive feedback loop in cultural evolution. 
What Burghardt’s SRT model predicts is that not 
only does play benefit from a surplus of resources, 
it is also instrumental to the replication of precisely 
that kind of environment.
We now recognize that play can be viewed as both 
a product and cause of evolutionary change; that is, 
playful activities may be a source of enhanced behav-
ioral and mental functioning as well as a by-product 
or remnant of prior evolutionary events. (Burghardt 
[2005]: 121)
If Burghardt’s claim has some ground, we 
should direct our efforts at understanding not 
only where play originates and how we inherited 
it, but most importantly how play modifies the 
human mind as our evolutionary tool par excel-
lence. What we are about to attempt in the next 
pages is to provide a framework that allows us to 
address this play/mind problem within the larger 
scope of evolutionary epistemology.
PATTERN: A FIGHT AGAINST ENTROPY
As the early study of cybernetics teaches us, 
complex systems survive in an environment of 
high uncertainty by signal redundancy and feed-
back self-regulation. Complex systems are by def-
inition emergences out of the interaction of sim-
pler units; bodies from cells; self-regulatory arti-
facts made from physical parts; learning systems 
made out from carbon or silicon based circuitry. 
In this light, living systems, societies, minds and 
viruses, all emerge as order and pattern against 
chaos and entropy.
We are immersed in a life in which the world as a 
whole obeys the second law of thermodynamics: con-
fusion increases and order decreases. Yet, as we have 
seen, the second law of thermodynamics, while it may 
be a valid statement about the whole of a closed sys-
tem, is definitely not valid concerning a non-isolated 
part of it.  There are local and temporary islands of 
decreasing entropy in a world in which the entropy as 
a whole tends to increase, and the existence of these 
islands enables some of us to assert the existence of 
progress. […] Remember that we ourselves constitute 
such an island of decreasing entropy, and that we live 
amongst other such islands. (Wiener [1950]: 40)
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If it weren’t for these “islands of decreas-
ing entropy”, life on Earth would not be possi-
ble. The process of adaptation presupposes that 
an information feedback is taking place between 
the species and its environment. We can portray 
adaptation as a feedback that allows a species to 
be informed or modified by environmental condi-
tions, so that an instrumental, albeit unconscious 
knowledge about its surroundings, can be stored 
and replicated by the reproduction of its genetic 
pool. By way of example: «A shark is beautifully 
shaped for locomotion in water, but the genome of 
the shark surely does not contain direct informa-
tion about hydrodynamics. Rather, the genome is 
supposed to contain information or instructions, 
which are the complement of hydrodynamics» 
(Bateson [1972]: 134). Far from having discov-
ered principles that underlie physical phenomena, 
the process of natural selection has attained a pre-
cise match between organism and environment by 
pure statistical means. Anatomical specialization 
as a result of natural selection takes many genera-
tions to be shaped to the environmental demands. 
Conversely, as anatomical specialization decreases 
and brains achieve representational power – which 
can also be expressed as neural specialization 
– the process of adaptation becomes faster and 
suppler, taking place within the ontogeny of the 
individual. We call this adaptation learning prop-
er. To anticipate and predict pattern accurately is 
what learning systems are all about. Our brains 
are modeled to recognize and expect pattern and 
regularity in our surroundings and continuously 
adjust their policies to actual contingencies. The 
information feedback we call natural selection 
has not been replaced by any means; it has been 
pushed to a new level of emergence that is men-
tal instead of physical. So in a fundamental sense, 
there’s a homology between life and learning; both 
can be described as information coupling that 
exerts selective control over variability, replicating 
what’s useful and discarding what’s not.
Plotkin and his colleagues (1982, 1987, 1988) […] 
have examined the basic assumptions of evolutionary 
theory as applied to intelligence. […] Intelligence, in 
this context, becomes much more than the capacity 
and skill of one individual mind. Rather, it includes 
the entire knowledge-structure of the species, as it is 
stored across the various levels available to the mul-
tilevel evolutionary process. Variation is generated at 
all four levels; the variants are tested, and the success-
ful variants are selected and then regenerated. (Don-
ald [1991]: 158)
If variation and selection are to be considered 
as learning either in the biological or behavioral 
levels, we can draw a continuous axis that goes 
from the phylogenetic development – as expressed 
in anatomical features of the fossil record – to the 
ontogenetic process of adaptation, which involves 
the expression of innate or acquired behavior – 
learning in its common usage –. We could even 
stress the axis further, to include cultural systems 
with their instances of variation and replication 
and make them too, subject to the same axioms of 
evolution. It should be stressed that human minds 
are never confined to the ontogenetic level, but 
keep developing by means of cultural transmis-
sion. The patterned practices that a culture bears 
witness to, are not strictly speaking inventions of 
individual minds but the outcomes of a distrib-
uted cognition system that is meant «to decrease 
entropy and increase the predictability of experi-
ence» (Hutchins [2013]: 13). According to the dis-
tributed cognition framework, human learning is 
based on knowledge structures not fully confined 
to individual brain activity, but distributed across 
individuals, artifacts, and culturally transmitted 
practices. For example, when solving an arithmeti-
cal problem, one individual may rely on formulas 
learned from tradition, or when opening a can 
with a can-opener, the problem solving process 
is partially off-loaded by means of a tool. In both 
examples, solutions are implicit and inherent to 
the problem design and cognition is to be char-
acterized as an interaction or affordance between 
individuals and their culturally mediated environ-
ments. In much the same way, we would like to 
argue that art expressions should be considered 
as knowledge structures whose role is to provide 
a shared cognition system while at the same time 
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off-loading resources of individual cognition in 
ready-made artifacts and templates, upon which 
individuals can reduce uncertainty and re-elabo-
rate creatively according to actual contingencies.
It might be contended that cultural transmis-
sion heavily relies on the invention of writing or 
what Merlin Donald (1991) has aptly called an 
External Symbolic System. It’s probably true that 
the use of symbols that could be stored outside 
human brains –e.g. written language– has rapidly 
enhanced the possibilities of cultural transmis-
sion and replication. In point of fact, this is the 
view advocated by Clark and Chalmers (1998) in 
what they call Extended cognition. However it is 
also true that literacy is a relatively recent innova-
tion in human evolution – only the last five thou-
sand years out of a roughly one hundred thousand 
years of history. Long before there were any means 
of encapsulating knowledge in external symbol-
ic systems, human beings were replicating their 
cultural environments effectively, sometimes for 
many hundreds of years. Evidence of prehistor-
ic early hominid stone tools and traditional tool 
making dated as old as 3.3 million years of age 
(Harmand et at, [2015]), provide strong evidence 
that a form of cultural transmission was taking 
place long before our species made its apparition 
in the map. From genetics all the way up to cul-
tural heritage, complex systems rely on informa-
tion transfer strategies of which the human use of 
symbols is but the tip of the iceberg. So what was 
going on before written language, or even prior 
to language acquisition? How did the long lasting 
informational couplings we call cultures emerge 
and shape themselves over the centuries?
In Claude Lévi-Strauss’s anthropological 
account (1964), culture is about transforming or 
incorporating into the human realm those wild 
elements of nature that would be otherwise dan-
gerous to manipulate. The act of cooking, tool 
making, the rites of passage between infancy and 
adulthood, marriages, funerals, and so forth, are 
all carefully punctuated by pattern and costly elab-
oration. In pre-modern societies art is far from 
being an isolated activity; it’s interwoven in all 
activities conducive to life, conveying important 
messages about the agents’ beliefs and concerns 
(Dissanayake [2000]). A recipe for preparing an 
otherwise poisonous root; a chant for propitiating 
supernatural agents before the construction of a 
boat; preparation of one’s body by means of self-
painting or entheogen consumption. Every human 
act bears the trace of a mind that does not extin-
guish completely as long as it is repeated accord-
ing to custom or tradition. So great is the rel-
evance attributed to these patterned elaborations, 
that if not performed correctly (i.e. according to 
tradition) they could easily lead to havoc and mis-
fortune. In Huizinga’s account:
The purpose of music and dance is to keep the world 
in its right course and to force Nature into benevo-
lence towards man. The year’s prosperity will depend 
on the right performance of sacred contests at the sea-
sonal feasts. If these gatherings do not take place the 
crops will not ripen. (Huizinga [1938]: 14)
In this light, when embedded in tradition, arts 
are anything but superfluous. In a fundamental 
way they’re aimed at giving pattern to exchanges 
with otherwise dangerous entities, either natural 
or supernatural, by replicating the age-old formu-
las of what makes a good living. Wiener’s quota-
tion at the beginning of this section reminds us 
that we as «such islands of decreasing entropy» 
are not surrounded by physical phenomena only, 
but our world is crowded with intentional agents, 
agents that expect and behave according to pat-
tern, agents that depend on connecting with each 
other in their fight against entropy. By building a 
network of meaningful practices, that is, by dis-
tributing cognition across artifacts and inheritable 
patterns of behaviors, a culture claims a life of its 
own, in which no individual is alone to cope with 
disorder and uncertainty.
AESTHETIC COMMUNICATION
Making sense out of experience and commu-
nicating it to others reliably is at the very core of 
human culture. In the preceding section, we pre-
sented the reader with an informational approach 
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to artistic behavior, wherein patterned practices 
served to build a distributed cognition system, 
by means of which individuals could engage in 
real life problems and contingencies, off-loading 
some of their resources in templates, formulas, 
or instructions learnt by tradition. Following this 
line of argument, art production and the cogni-
tive response to the arts must have been selected 
early in our species’ development as a special form 
of social communication, rendering informational 
couplings, which language acquisition could not 
make totally superfluous. The now famous quote 
by choreographer Isadora Duncan «if I could tell 
you what it meant, there would be no point in 
dancing it» (Bateson [1972]: 137) boldly declares 
this fundamental irreducibility of human arts to 
the symbolic domain, and their right to be consid-
ered as an altogether different sort of communica-
tion; namely, aesthetic communication.
Aesthetic communication only takes place 
between intentional agents. Before we can prop-
erly declare the objective meaning of an aesthet-
ic message, we can feel the intent the agent has 
ciphered in it. By glancing at the arrangement 
of its parts, we are acquainted with a physical or 
spiritual state of affairs (meaning) and an agent’s 
state of mind when performing the behavior 
(emotion). If we can read the message properly, 
our cognitive response will be that of recogni-
tion. That is, the message contains recognizable 
features, which serve as a frame for aesthetic 
engagement between encoder and decoder. There 
is no aesthetic experience without a sort of inti-
macy, an intimacy that mirrors a mind’s effort to 
attain order from chaos and participates in this 
never-ending task. Even in the contemplation of 
natural beauty, in its appreciation of order, bal-
ance or magnificence, our mind is not capable of 
withdrawing completely from the recognition of 
intent. This, among other things, has lead the vast 
majority of cultures to believe through the ages, in 
supernatural agencies, either benevolent or mer-
ciless, and bears witness of the pervasiveness of 
what Daniel Dennett (2006) has aptly called the 
«intentional-stance». Aesthetic experience always 
betrays a message, that is, the willing expecta-
tion to communicate with one another. And that 
is precisely why aesthetic communication has 
played such a crucial role in shaping and replicat-
ing human culture. Traditional arts not only pro-
vide a way to formalize meaning and emotion by 
means of abstract structures, they actually allow 
communication to take place across the barriers of 
space and time. When a material outcome of art 
finds a support that outlives its agent, such as the 
case with Upper Paleolithic cave art, the physical 
attributes of form, color, movement and rhythm 
we perceive, bear traces of meaning and emotion 
that regain a life of its own. At an unconscious 
level, we could say that cave art functions in this 
example as an encoded message that delivers a 
specific set of cognitive instructions; a musical 
sheet nobody has ever taught us how to read, but 
which however we can play as expert interpreters.
Generally speaking, color is a power which directly 
influences the soul. Color is the keyboard, the eyes are 
the hammers, the soul is the piano with many strings. 
The artist is the hand which plays, touching one key 
or another, to cause vibrations in the soul. (Kandin-
sky [1914]: 43)
How are meaning and emotion rendered by 
the aesthetic experience? First of all, the time and 
effort invested in the performance should bear wit-
ness to the importance of the matter at hand. It 
has been argued by Alcorta and Sosis (2005) that 
it is only by wasting resources, or what’s known in 
ethology as costly signaling, that others can trust 
the message as honest and reliable. Secondly, the 
performance has to achieve order, which is, as 
we said before, emergence of pattern from sim-
pler parts. Sounds, colors, movements should be 
arranged in rhythms, cadences and frequencies, so 
as to produce expectation, prediction, surprise or 
resolution. And thirdly, the performance must be 
permeated with deep emotion, in order to produce 
aesthetic engagement. We could hypothesize that 
these are three basic attributes of the arts, which 
are biologically rooted: Costliness, Pattern, and 
Emotional attunement. When the three of them 
coalesce what we get is aesthetic communication.
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So far we have seen that aesthetic communi-
cation provides culture with a means to preserve 
and transfer non-symbolic information, encoding 
it in costly pattern; pattern that functions as a key 
stimuli that releases meaningful and emotional 
responses in their recipients, making them, too, 
agents of novel ways in which the successful pat-
tern can be modified and reproduced. The work 
of art is never experienced as the sum of quali-
ties of an external object, but as the embodiment 
of an I – You relationship, to use Buber’s (1923) 
terminology. That’s why the intimacy we find in 
the arts is experienced as a sort of resonance, or 
as Plato would have phrased it, as remembering 
(ἀνάμνησις) of an ideal form. As we will see fur-
ther, aesthetic communication builds upon mir-
roring neural systems that have been developed by 
an array of social species. So the illusion of being 
identified with the author (Pseudo-Longinus [c. 
1st ce. A.D]; Stravinsky [1940]) or the paradox of 
remembering a pattern when we are exposed to it 
for the first time, might not turn out to be so met-
aphysical after all.
AESTHETIC EMOTIONS IN PLAY  
AND THE ARTS
One of the three biologically rooted compo-
nents that we mentioned earlier in this work is 
emotional response. Along with costliness and 
pattern, emotional response to the arts is one per-
vasive feature of the aesthetic experience. One 
cannot imagine a work of communal art that 
involves the effort of many individuals nor the 
attainment and recognition of order and beau-
ty out of rough materials, without some kind of 
emotional involvement. We invest and engage in 
aesthetic communication because we care. As we 
emphasized before, intentionality is not just the 
corollary of a message, but the frame by which an 
otherwise totally accidental arrangement of sensi-
tive parts becomes informative. When studying 
the arts, to neglect emotion would be to neglect 
the motivational context in which the behavior is 
embedded, which would rob the activity of any 
meaning. Meaning, as we have shown above, is by 
necessity an inextricable part of what brains have 
evolved to construe out of experience. The time 
is ripe for our evolutionary account of the arts, to 
look into the phylogeny of emotions, answering 
what has been their role in shaping aesthetic com-
munication in our social species.
Altriciality is probably one of the most distinc-
tive traits of our species. We are born defenseless 
and depend completely in our caregivers for many 
years before we can be completely autonomous. 
Feeding, clothing, and shelter might be granted in 
a domesticated environment but, as we know, this 
hasn’t been always the case. Since newborns can-
not handle any kind of symbolic communication, 
there’s a strong selective pressure in caregivers for 
emotional coupling. Is the newborn cold, hungry, 
bored or sleepy? If it weren’t for emotional bond-
ing the survival rate of newborns would drop, and 
so would the genes of unsympathetic caregivers.
During this time, infants and toddlers can develop, 
use, and rely on nonverbal, gestural, emotional sig-
nals to meet basic needs, interact, and communicate. 
These years provide continuous opportunities to learn 
and fine-tune the skills of emotional signaling; these 
skills will continue to be learned and refined during 
the course of life even after words and other symbols 
are mastered. (Greenspan, Shanker [2006]: 29)
Our species comes from a long phylogeny of 
social mammals in which this selection process 
has already taken place for over three hundred 
million years; no wonder we have developed spe-
cialized neural mechanisms for emotional tun-
ing between babies and caregivers! It should be 
stressed, too, that these are the very same mech-
anisms at play when interacting with conspecifis. 
Joint attention, empathic response to fear, and 
learning by imitation, have all been selected for as 
exapted forms of emotional coupling. Despite the 
fact that emotions in other species are not always 
easy to identify, we can confront animal social 
play against Burghardt’s second criterion and infer 
a high predominance of positive emotions with 
reinforcing characteristics. The absence of imme-
diate survival benefits – Burghardt’s first criterion 
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– further supports this inference. Social play is a 
special form of interaction in which the sensitive 
attributes of behavior – exaggerated movements, 
surprise, repetition, chance, resolution – become 
a source of pleasure for the players. The particular 
sequence – Burghardt’s third criterion – we find 
in playful behavior detaches itself from the spe-
cies-typical repertoire, many times signaling the 
opposite of what it means in real life. A stronger 
individual might actually self-handicap to signal 
a weaker counterpart the interaction is «not as in 
real life». Dogs can take turns chasing each other, 
and bonobos will hang many feet over the ground 
relying completely in a partner’s hand as if vital 
risk weren’t an issue (Behncke [2015]). As the Sur-
plus Resources Theory (SRT) predicts, social play-
fulness will increase according to the availability 
of resources in the environment. Burghardt’s fifth 
criterion establishes that the animal is adequately 
fed, healthy, and free from stress. In Craig’s (1918) 
terminology we would say that the animal is nei-
ther engaged in an appetitive nor a consummatory 
behavior, but is in a relaxed field (Bally [1945]). 
What’s interesting for the problem at hand is 
the fundamental difference between the emo-
tional value of play and survival-driven behavior. 
Whilst a basic survival emotion such as fear, has 
been selected for a specific action course (fight or 
flight), playful emotions are intrinsic, freestand-
ing, and respond to stimuli in a detached way, 
more concerned with the sensitive attributes of 
the performance and the agents at play than with 
the material outcomes of the sequence (i.e. con-
summatory behavior). Furthermore, social play 
presupposes that, up to a certain point, the agents 
involved share the same playful intent. It is not 
rare when dealing with signals that some of them 
should elicit consummatory behavior – as when 
the play-fights of dogs become too rough. That’s 
why the framing of play has to be periodically 
reestablished through emotional signaling. This 
explains why a basic emotion such as fear can be 
experienced as thrill, and fight or flight not as sur-
vival responses, but as punctuation in a sequence 
of joyful engagement between the players. The 
logical conclusion would be that during social 
play, animals are sharing messages about the con-
text of their engagement, a frame, or meta-messag-
es, to use Bateson’s (1972) terminology.
At a neural level, the discovery of brain mir-
roring neural systems (Rizzollati et al [2004]) has 
given some physiological ground to the shared 
intentionality hypothesis. Some social skills as 
joint attention, imitation behavior and goal pre-
diction have been found to depend on a specific 
set of mirror neurons that fires both when per-
forming and observing an action.
Our understanding of others as intentional agents 
does not exclusively depend on language, but also on 
the relational nature of action. In many situations we 
can directly grasp the meaning of other people’s basic 
actions thanks to the motor equivalence between what 
others do and what we can do. (Gallese [2017]: 44)
If mirror neural systems have played so criti-
cal a role in the development of social skills across 
taxa such as birds, rodents and primates, we surely 
can infer their activation in social play interac-
tions, wherein context leans heavily on adequate-
ly assessing a counterpart’s intentionality. In this 
light, by the amount and variability of social play 
interactions we could predict a group’s ability to 
act and respond together to urgent environmen-
tal pressures. This leads us to what Burghardt 
calls tertiary play process, «play behavior that has 
gained a major, if not critical, role in modifying 
and enhancing behavioral abilities and fitness, 
including the development of innovation and cre-
ativity» (Burghardt [2005]: 119). Drawing on this 
hypothesis, Isabel Behncke (2015) has conducted 
a compelling fieldwork with a bonobo commu-
nity living south of the Congo River in the DRC: 
«Playing with individuals of different sizes, per-
sonalities and sex requires learning about contex-
tual-dependent behavior: with whom and when 
a bite is appropriate, a chase over a push, a gen-
tle tickle rather than a stomping slap, and so on» 
(Behncke [2015]: 27).
If social play enhances emotional signaling 
that means it influences group cohesiveness. By 
sharing intentionality and emotions with others 
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in the relaxed field of social play, emotional read-
ing would not only have gained accuracy but also 
led to the emergence of all kinds of new emo-
tional subtleties that simply weren’t there as innate 
responses to external stimuli. These findings begin 
to shed some light on the hitherto mysterious ori-
gin of human emotional expressivity. By learning 
to mimic non-voluntary emotional responses, and 
then playing with them by exaggerating or modi-
fying the sequence of motor expression, human 
beings could for the first time share important 
information offline, namely, in absence of an envi-
ronmental key stimuli, inaugurating what Mer-
lin Donald (1991) calls Mimetic Culture. This is a 
momentous leap where social play, as seen across 
animal and human domains, enables the emer-
gence of aesthetic emotions. We may now char-
acterize aesthetic emotions as encompassing: 1. 
Empathy: the neural basis for emotional mirroring 
2. Motivational autonomy: reframing the mean-
ing of behavior outside a survival driven context 
and 3. Pleasure: positive emotional response, act-
ing as a reinforcement mechanism for both brain 
restructuring processes and social bonding. In 
a deeper analysis, the aesthetic communication 
we find in play provides the basis for an adaptive 
modeling of reality wherein the agents simulate 
possible exchanges and outcomes, further enhanc-
ing –by proxy– their ability to predict and adapt 
to natural and intentional contingencies. If, as 
we have been arguing, culture depends on mak-
ing sense of experience and providing a means 
by which this knowledge can be preserved, trans-
ferred, and re-elaborated, then aesthetic emotions 
must have had a pivotal role in the beginnings of 
human arts. Fear, anger or zest are emotions that, 
when aroused in their primary form, can only 
lead to action, but when deprived of their sur-
vival urgency and presented in a punctuated, pat-
terned and meaningful manner, pave the way for 
the playful detachment so distinctive of aesthetic 
communication.
The visible traces of the creative gestures activate in 
the observer the specific motor areas controlling the 
execution of the same gestures. Beholders’ eyes catch 
not only information about the shape, direction and 
texture of the cuts or strokes; by means of embodied 
simulation they breach into the actual motor expres-
sion of the artist when creating the artwork. (Gallese 
[2017]: 45)
Hence we can see how aesthetic communica-
tion has evolved from animal social play to forms 
of extraordinary complexity such as deliberate art 
production for the purpose of cultural transmis-
sion; namely traditional art. Drawing from our 
inherited capabilities of costly signaling, pattern 
predilection, and emotional attunement, we can 
connect and extract valuable information from the 
readily available artifacts we find in our culture. 
As human beings, we participate throughout our 
development in this cultural scaffolding, and we 
probably never give it up completely. The extraor-
dinary leaps in learning that we observe in a few 
years of a child’s development rely in the acquisi-
tion of patterns readily available in the child’s cul-
tural environment. As newborns we wake into a 
patterned and meaningful world, during infancy 
we play with reality until we are able to deal with 
it, in adolescence we begin to grasp the moral 
values of our culture, and as adults we have the 
chance to exert them and deliver them to others. 
But across all life stages we depend on our cul-
tural network of meaning to keep us in balance, 
to support us and to make sense of life’s seeming 
disorder; birth, loss, failure, success, disappoint-
ment. We have learned how to express our emo-
tions because we have shaped them into cultural 
templates; grieving, falling in love, forgiving, are 
all internalized memories of our cultural heritage. 
In an interesting hypothesis, John Pfeiffer (1981) 
refers to Upper Paleolithic cave art as part of larg-
er multimodal experiences endowing the young-
sters with the community’s library during the rites 
of passage:
The richer the experience, that is, the more associa-
tions attached to it, the more widespread its “ripple” 
effect in the brain and its ultimate representation in 
the hierarchies and networks of memory. […] Total 
sensory bombardment was essential when, in the 
absence of libraries, the brain itself had to serve as 
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library. The effort, which today goes into the prepara-
tion of books, the research and organization and style 
illustrations, went into the preparation of ceremonies 
during the Upper Paleolithic. (Pfeiffer [1982]: 220)
Cultural scaffolding never takes place without 
aesthetic communication. It needs to be played 
out, so to speak, making the child believe he has 
“created an object” that was already there (Win-
nicott [1971]). If it were possible to translate this 
kind of communication into a purely symbolic 
message without losing something essential there 
would be no point in playing it. The more we 
depend and confidently play within these net-
works of meaning, the richer our experience of 
the world becomes and so do our possibilities 
of living creatively. Once an aesthetic message 
becomes canonical (traditional), it begins to live 
in the minds of countless generations of hosts, 
activating patterns – by means of neural mirroring 
systems –, which in turn, are creatively modified 
and replicated as open source programming. An 
original work is never the achievement of a sin-
gle or isolated mind, but of a distributed cognition 
system of themes, templates, recipes and canoni-
cal structures, which serve as basis for creative 
expression:
Every minister in every faith is like a jazz musician, 
keeping traditions alive by playing the beloved stand-
ards the way they are supposed to be played, but also 
incessantly gauging and deciding, slowing the pace 
or speeding up, deleting or adding another phrase to 
a prayer, mixing familiarity and novelty in just the 
right proportions to grab the minds and hearts of the 
listeners in attendance. (Dennett [2006]: 154)
This transitional template granted by aes-
thetic communication will probably not take us 
materially to the far reaches of space and time, 
as abstract reasoning and applied science some-
times claim, but in keeping its flame alive, at least 
we will not arrive there so empty-spirited as to 
be totally deaf to the music of the spheres which 
inspired our quest in the first place.
THE ILLUSION OF A CLOSURE
In this article, we have shown how aesthetic 
communication has had a crucial role in the scaf-
folding of mind allowing us to build a distributed 
cognition system we call our human world. We 
have proposed that art, as a human form of play 
behavior, is far from superfluous, and we have giv-
en several examples of its evolutionary payoffs. A 
question of great scientific interest is whether the 
aesthetic communication we find in the human 
arts still serves a purpose in our contemporary 
forms of cultural transmission. Huizinga (1935), 
Guénon (1945), Donald (1991), Dissanayake 
(2000), and Bellah (2011) have all shown special 
concern with the cultural drift we’re experienc-
ing from the fading out of traditional societies. 
Having crossed the threshold of mythic culture, 
rites and ceremonies are no longer a universally 
legitimate commentary on human experience. 
Theory and criticism have replaced, maybe with-
out return, the feasts, narratives and séances that 
used to keep the human world from falling apart. 
Analytical thought, with its development through 
technology, has had a pervasive effect in modern 
society; its supremacy is not only felt in media, 
education, government and production, but also 
in ethics, where it questions traditional values and 
aims to replace them with conventional or utili-
tarian principles. In this regard, art has become 
isolated, as some sort of luxury of the civilized 
world; or an «accursed share», to use Bataille’s 
(1949) image. Confronting this state of affairs, we 
must remember that, «the stability, resilience, or 
persistence of a practice depends on the network 
of relations to other practices within which it is 
embedded» (Hutchins [2013]: 13). If, as we have 
portrayed so far, aesthetic communication has had 
such a pivotal role in the evolution of our spe-
cies, conveying informational couplings between 
human beings and the worlds we deal with, scien-
tific effort should be aimed at understanding what 
kind of knowledge we jeopardize by building our 
society based on the sole value of profit and utility, 
and how this bias is acting in or against our ben-
efit in the long run. If aesthetic communication 
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is to be considered, like Bateson (1972) thought, 
as a sort of «unconscious ecology», a pattern that 
connects islands of decreasing entropy, then the 
waning of art at the verge of ecological disaster 
begins to be a non-trivial matter. We would like to 
draw this article to its logical conclusion by quot-
ing once again a man who saw that play was any-
thing but superfluous. Huizinga’s In the Shadow 
of Tomorrow, a work deeply concerned with the 
cultural disease of our times, contains a sentence 
which aptly synthesizes the message of our own 
essay: «If we are to preserve culture we must con-
tinue to create it» (Huizinga [1935]: 35).
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